Nation wide airport shutdown….

SurfnFish said:
'copper to optic fiber router upgrade at a remote facility'....we converted hundreds of blds from copper to fiber and never once lost an internet connection much less interrupted an entire national infrastructure system....let's not focus on the 'super intelligence' AI module turned on the day before the failure...lies flow from this administration like crap from a baby's butt, everyone in it is absolutely incapable of telling the truth about anything and everything.
Click to expand...

Trying to understand how that could happen...Google says....
"The claim that a single misconfigured or faulty router can trigger a cascading overload across a major network is true—it is a well-documented phenomenon in networking, though the skepticism from IT professionals highlights just how unusual and preventable it should be on a modern network.

Why It Is Technically Possible
  • Control-Plane Flooding: While 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds (about 200 to 250 requests per second) sounds tiny compared to modern internet bandwidth, those requests hit a router's control plane (its CPU), not just its data pipes. When a newly installed router malfunctions or enters a misconfigured routing loop, it can rapidly spam neighboring routers with peering requests, BGP updates, or broadcast storms, consuming their processing power.
  • Legacy Hardware Bottlenecks: The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) still relies heavily on decades-old, low-bandwidth legacy hardware and Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) switches designed for old copper lines. A sudden flood of modern IP-based connection requests can easily choke older equipment that lacks modern rate-limiting or CPU protections. [1, 2]
  • Cascading Failovers: According to FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, once the initial routers were overwhelmed, traffic automatically failed over to backup routers at other centers, spreading the instability across 17 of the 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. [1, 2]

Why Some IT Professionals Are Skeptical
Network engineers online have expressed disbelief for two main reasons, both of which point to systemic design flaws rather than technical impossibility:
  • Lack of Segmentation and Rate-Limiting: In any properly architected enterprise network, edge routers at a remote site (like El Dorado, Arkansas) are strictly isolated with Access Control Lists (ACLs) and control-plane policing. A remote edge device should never have the permissions or capacity to flood core national infrastructure. [1]
  • Outdated Change Management: IT professionals are also stunned that live core-network cutovers were happening on a Friday afternoon—one of the busiest travel windows of the week—and that the FAA had to sift through manual paper logs for 45 minutes just to figure out which contractor crew had plugged in new hardware. [1, 2]
In short, the scenario is entirely possible when modern IP equipment is bridged onto fragile legacy infrastructure without proper network isolation—which is why the FAA and L3Harris have pulled the routers from both Arkansas and Texas for lab diagnostics."
 
fatbillybob said:
Trying to understand how that could happen...Google says....
"The claim that a single misconfigured or faulty router can trigger a cascading overload across a major network is true—it is a well-documented phenomenon in networking, though the skepticism from IT professionals highlights just how unusual and preventable it should be on a modern network.

Why It Is Technically Possible
  • Control-Plane Flooding: While 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds (about 200 to 250 requests per second) sounds tiny compared to modern internet bandwidth, those requests hit a router's control plane (its CPU), not just its data pipes. When a newly installed router malfunctions or enters a misconfigured routing loop, it can rapidly spam neighboring routers with peering requests, BGP updates, or broadcast storms, consuming their processing power.
  • Legacy Hardware Bottlenecks: The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) still relies heavily on decades-old, low-bandwidth legacy hardware and Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) switches designed for old copper lines. A sudden flood of modern IP-based connection requests can easily choke older equipment that lacks modern rate-limiting or CPU protections. [1, 2]
  • Cascading Failovers: According to FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, once the initial routers were overwhelmed, traffic automatically failed over to backup routers at other centers, spreading the instability across 17 of the 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. [1, 2]

Why Some IT Professionals Are Skeptical
Network engineers online have expressed disbelief for two main reasons, both of which point to systemic design flaws rather than technical impossibility:
  • Lack of Segmentation and Rate-Limiting: In any properly architected enterprise network, edge routers at a remote site (like El Dorado, Arkansas) are strictly isolated with Access Control Lists (ACLs) and control-plane policing. A remote edge device should never have the permissions or capacity to flood core national infrastructure. [1]
  • Outdated Change Management: IT professionals are also stunned that live core-network cutovers were happening on a Friday afternoon—one of the busiest travel windows of the week—and that the FAA had to sift through manual paper logs for 45 minutes just to figure out which contractor crew had plugged in new hardware. [1, 2]
In short, the scenario is entirely possible when modern IP equipment is bridged onto fragile legacy infrastructure without proper network isolation—which is why the FAA and L3Harris have pulled the routers from both Arkansas and Texas for lab diagnostics."
Click to expand...
great job echoing the party line....and absolute horsepuckey it is.
I built/rebuilt interconnected high demand data centers around the globe that hosted DNS top level web traffic for .com and .net, protected the firewalls for Wall Street and a large chunk of the Fortune 500 companies, and two cross linked for the Feds that screen US cell calls via SS7 capture....we never once lost a connection or shut down a service. Cooper to fiber conversion is at the lowest rung of technical demand, the new fiber system is built air gapped from the legacy system, proofed, and then cut over at minimal peak traffic hours.
So biz as usual, f'up, blame others, cover the truth.
 
SurfnFish said:
great job echoing the party line....and absolute horsepuckey it is.
I built/rebuilt interconnected high demand data centers around the globe that hosted DNS top level web traffic for .com and .net, protected the firewalls for Wall Street and a large chunk of the Fortune 500 companies, and two cross linked for the Feds that screen US cell calls via SS7 capture....we never once lost a connection or shut down a service. Cooper to fiber conversion is at the lowest rung of technical demand, the new fiber system is built air gapped from the legacy system, proofed, and then cut over at minimal peak traffic hours.
So biz as usual, f'up, blame others, cover the truth.
Click to expand...
Why weren't you there to save us?
 
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fatbillybob said:
Trying to understand how that could happen...Google says....
"The claim that a single misconfigured or faulty router can trigger a cascading overload across a major network is true—it is a well-documented phenomenon in networking, though the skepticism from IT professionals highlights just how unusual and preventable it should be on a modern network.

Why It Is Technically Possible
  • Control-Plane Flooding: While 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds (about 200 to 250 requests per second) sounds tiny compared to modern internet bandwidth, those requests hit a router's control plane (its CPU), not just its data pipes. When a newly installed router malfunctions or enters a misconfigured routing loop, it can rapidly spam neighboring routers with peering requests, BGP updates, or broadcast storms, consuming their processing power.
  • Legacy Hardware Bottlenecks: The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) still relies heavily on decades-old, low-bandwidth legacy hardware and Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) switches designed for old copper lines. A sudden flood of modern IP-based connection requests can easily choke older equipment that lacks modern rate-limiting or CPU protections. [1, 2]
  • Cascading Failovers: According to FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford, once the initial routers were overwhelmed, traffic automatically failed over to backup routers at other centers, spreading the instability across 17 of the 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. [1, 2]

Why Some IT Professionals Are Skeptical
Network engineers online have expressed disbelief for two main reasons, both of which point to systemic design flaws rather than technical impossibility:
  • Lack of Segmentation and Rate-Limiting: In any properly architected enterprise network, edge routers at a remote site (like El Dorado, Arkansas) are strictly isolated with Access Control Lists (ACLs) and control-plane policing. A remote edge device should never have the permissions or capacity to flood core national infrastructure. [1]
  • Outdated Change Management: IT professionals are also stunned that live core-network cutovers were happening on a Friday afternoon—one of the busiest travel windows of the week—and that the FAA had to sift through manual paper logs for 45 minutes just to figure out which contractor crew had plugged in new hardware. [1, 2]
In short, the scenario is entirely possible when modern IP equipment is bridged onto fragile legacy infrastructure without proper network isolation—which is why the FAA and L3Harris have pulled the routers from both Arkansas and Texas for lab diagnostics."
Click to expand...
We got hacked. Like an attack hack. I don't know what's worse the incompetence it takes to make a disaster like this possible or an attack hack.
 
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